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Start-Up Sports Leagues: Why These
Leagues Are Entitled to Use the Ruinous
Competition Defense to Justify
Anticompetitive Restraints
Marc P. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law does not yield a consistent principle about the proper
characterization of sports leagues.1 A league’s teams are considered
to be a joint venture of independent teams for most purposes,2 and in
rare instances, may be characterized as a single entity3 for other
purposes.4 This characterization of a league as a single entity has
traditionally been extremely important because the Sherman Act
contains an important distinction between concerted and independent
action.5 Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply to true single

*

J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., cum laude, University of
Pennsylvania, 1998. I would like to thank Professor Mark Patterson for his invaluable
guidance and advice, and my family and friends for their patience and support.
1
Robert E. Freitas, Overview: Looking Ahead at Sports and the Antitrust Law,
ANTITRUST (2000). There has been a great deal of litigation about whether sports leagues
should be considered single entities by the courts. See N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l
Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that some aspects of a league could
be characterized as a single entity, while others may not).
2
See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
3
In the sports context, a single entity is a single economic unit that is centrally
controlled and whose actors perform as one. The teams within a single-entity league are not
“owned” by any one person or entity. See Heike K. Sullivan, Comment, Fraser v. Major
League Soccer: The MLS’s Single-Entity Structure Is a “Sham”, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, n.7
(2000). All of the investors in the League contribute to the League as a whole. Id.
4
For example, the NBA is considered a single entity solely for the purpose of
negotiating its national television contract. Chi. Prof’l, 95 F.3d at 600.
5
See Freitas, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 761 (1984))).
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entities, but does apply to any “combination” in restraint of trade.6 A
league is thus immune from antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of the
Sherman Act if it is characterized as a single entity.
New sports leagues have recently emerged in men’s and women’s
soccer, women’s basketball, and men’s football.7 These leagues
were specifically formed as single entities to take advantage of the
supposed economic benefits,8 and perhaps more importantly, to
avoid antitrust scrutiny. 9 Regardless of whether the new leagues are
true single entities, however, I will argue in this Note that antitrust
scrutiny of these new leagues should be relaxed while they are in
their beginning stages of development.
This relaxed antitrust scrutiny is necessary because start-up
professional sports leagues are more risky than other industries and
have staggering start-up costs. This Note argues that new leagues, in
their initial development (regardless of whether they are a true single
entity), should be permitted to behave in ways that would otherwise
be considered anticompetitive, in order to create some level of
comfort for league owners and investors that heavy start-up costs can
be recouped. Without the ability to impose regulations that reduce
competition among the member teams, it is likely that the new
leagues will fail.
They would likely fail because vigorous
6

Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: “Every contract, combination . . .
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared illegal.” 15 U.S.C. §
1 (2001).
7
The men’s soccer league, Major League Soccer [hereinafter MLS], played its
inaugural season in 1996. The women’s professional soccer league, the Women’s United
Soccer Association [hereinafter WUSA], played its inaugural season in 2001. Two
women’s basketball leagues, the Women’s National Basketball Association [hereinafter
WNBA] and the American Basketball League, played their inaugural seasons in 1997. The
new men’s football league, the XFL, played its first and only season in 2001.
8
Preventing skyrocketing salaries, maintaining competitive balance, and enhancing
advertising revenue are all thought to be easier under this league structure.
9
See Rob Atherton, Note, Fraser v. Major League Soccer (MLS): The Future of the
Single-Entity League and the International Transfer System, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 887, 88990 (1998) (describing how new sports leagues have been formed as single entities). The
single-entity structure adopted by MLS, however, has been termed a “sham” and charged
with violating both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998). The court in Fraser ruled in favor of
MLS, holding that the league is a single entity and thus ruling out any possibility of a
section 1 violation. Id. This decision is currently on appeal.
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competition among a league’s teams would drive costs to
prohibitively high levels, and consequently, no league would be able
to exist.
The history of sports leagues in America confirms that consumers
benefit from the emergence of new, financially sound leagues.10
There are significant benefits that a city can realize from having a
successful professional franchise. These benefits include an increase
in jobs, an increase in tax revenues for the city, urban redevelopment
surrounding the arena or stadium, and an increase in civic pride.11
These benefits, however, are not likely to accrue to the new leagues
that have started in the past decade. This is because the new leagues
are so concerned about the possibility of failure that they are unlikely
to make risky, large capital investments that could increase the
likelihood of long-term success.
The Supreme Court typically rejects the argument that “ruinous
competition”12 among competitors warrants agreements among those
competitors to restrict competition.13
Courts, however, have
embraced a modified form of the ruinous competition defense in
some cases involving the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(hereinafter “NCAA”).14 Over the past two decades, courts have
permitted the NCAA to justify restrictions that would traditionally be
deemed anticompetitive by allowing the NCAA to argue that
particular restraints are necessary to preserve amateurism and
maintain competitive balance among its member schools.15 The
10

See Christian M. McBurney, Note, The Legality of Sports Leagues’ Restrictive
Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 941 (1985).
11
See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
12
The term “ruinous competition” refers to industry competitors competing so
vigorously that they ultimately drive each other out of business. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Essay, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV.
105, 123 (1989).
13
See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-24 (1940).
14
The NCAA is a private, nonprofit association consisting of approximately 1,000
academically accredited universities in the United States. Stephen M. Schott, Give Them
What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 30 (1996). The NCAA is divided into three divisions based
upon the size and competitive level of the athletic programs. Id.
15
See, e.g., Adidas Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097
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NCAA argues that without rules that preserve amateurism and
maintain competitive balance, member schools would drive each
other out of business. The NCAA reasons that the high costs
associated with attracting labor inputs (the student-athletes) in a free
market will reduce parity because so few schools would be able to
pay marquee student-athletes their market value. Thus, these high
costs would significantly diminish consumer demand for NCAA
sports, consequently eliminating the NCAA as we know it.
Courts continue to accept the NCAA’s arguments that its
anticompetitive restraints are necessary to preserve amateurism and
competitive balance among member institutions despite the rampant
commercialization and professionalization of “big-time” college
athletics. In light of holdings with regard to cases involving the
NCAA, it is appropriate that courts assess the evolving
characteristics of professional sports leagues, particularly start-up
leagues, in deciding the appropriate applicability of the antitrust
laws.16
This Note will argue that courts should provide treatment to startup sports leagues that is similar to their treatment of the NCAA. Part
I will explain how the NCAA has justified its restrictions by arguing
that they are needed to preserve amateurism and competitive balance
among member schools. Part I will also prove that courts implicitly
allow use of the ruinous competition argument by accepting the
NCAA’s arguments. Part II will discuss courts’ treatment of the
ruinous competition argument in a non-sports context. Part III will
argue that similar to how courts have treated some of the restraints of
the NCAA, courts should permit a start-up sports league’s restraints
to exist because of the unique, risky nature of sports and the
procompetitive benefits that sports leagues generate.

(D. Kan. 1999); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.
1988); Hennessey v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
16
Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues
Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 760 (1987).
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I. THE NCAA’S ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RESTRICTIONS
In challenges to its restrictions, the NCAA usually argues that its
restraints are justified for two reasons. The first justification is that
its restrictions are necessary to preserve amateurism. The second
justification is that its restrictions are necessary to maintain
competitive balance among member schools. Embedded in these
two arguments is the underlying defense that the restrictions are
necessary to preserve the current product of intercollegiate sports by
enabling member schools to refrain from competing with each other
off the field for labor inputs (student-athletes). Indeed, in some cases
the NCAA has expressly stated that without its restrictions, the
product of college sports would fail.17 The NCAA has thus used a
modified version of the ruinous competition defense to justify its
conduct.
Ruinous competition typically refers to a situation where in the
absence of an agreement, firms in a particular industry drive
themselves out of business because of vigorous competition.18 This
competition leads either to the end of the industry or the survival of
one competitor that is then able to demand monopoly prices.19 This
typical ruinous competition defense focuses on what will happen to
the supply of firms in a particular industry when the firms compete
with each other.
In cases challenging its restrictions, the NCAA has used the
ruinous competition defense by suggesting that in the absence of its
rules, the product of intercollegiate sports would be destroyed
because of fierce competition among member schools.20 In these
NCAA cases, however, the NCAA seems to use a modified form of
the traditional ruinous competition defense because it addresses both
the supply and demand side of its industry.
17
Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The
NCAA argues that reducing costs can be considered a procompetitive justification because
doing so is necessary to maintain the existence of competitive intercollegiate sports.”).
18
See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 127.
19
Id.
20
See Law, 134 F.3d at 1023; Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153.
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The NCAA’s ruinous competition defense is based on the premise
that any reduction in the supply of teams could lead to the
destruction of its organization. In the absence of its rules the NCAA
seems to fear that: a) the costs of maintaining a competitive athletic
program would be so high that many schools would abandon their
programs, thus destroying the NCAA as we know it because of a
huge reduction in the supply of schools fielding teams; and b)
competitive balance, or parity, among member schools would
disappear, thus reducing consumers’ demand to see NCAA sports
because of a lack of close contests, and thus also leading to the
destruction of the NCAA as we know it.
Section A of this Part defines and explains the importance of
amateurism to the NCAA, and explains how the notion of
amateurism has been used by the NCAA to justify restrictions that
reduce competition among member schools. Section B of this Part
explains how the NCAA’s argument that its rules are necessary to
maintain competitive balance is tantamount to arguing that the rules
are necessary to prevent ruinous competition among member
schools. Section C analyzes the courts’ treatment of such arguments.
A. The Significance and Meaning of Amateurism to the NCAA
The NCAA was founded upon the ideal of amateurism.21 To
maintain amateurism in intercollegiate sports, the NCAA has created
an extensive set of rules that identifies permissible conduct by
student-athletes enabling them to retain their eligibility.22 Studentathletes are prohibited from participating in intercollegiate sports if
they sign a contract with an agent, declare themselves eligible for a

21

See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
The NCAA Constitution is a manual that defines, inter alia, the purpose of the NCAA
and numerous eligibility requirements that its member institutions must follow. NCAA
Constitution, available at http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter
Const.]. One of the purposes of the NCAA is, “[t]o encourage its members to adopt
eligibility rules to comply with . . . standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and
amateurism.” Id. at art. 1.2(c).
22
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professional draft in the sport in which they participate, or receive
any type of payment based upon their athletic skill.23
Amateurism has many meanings to the NCAA. It would be too
narrow a definition to say that amateurism simply means that
student-athletes should play for the love of the game,24 or that
amateurism is strictly about prohibiting student-athletes from
receiving any form of payment based upon their skill in a particular
sport. 25 Amateurism is an ideal that the NCAA relies upon because
it believes that the amateurism of the players and member schools
(for not paying their players) differentiates collegiate athletics from
their professional counterparts, and has enabled college sports to
flourish.26
The NCAA believes that the amateur nature of intercollegiate
sports creates a unique product that holds a special appeal for
consumers.27 The NCAA also believes that preserving amateurism
enables student-athletes to be protected from exploitation by
commercial enterprises, such as shoe manufacturers and
unscrupulous agents.28
More importantly for the NCAA, though, maintaining amateurism
helps the organization keep costs down by permitting schools to field
athletic programs without competing for players by paying them to
come to a particular school. The relatively low cost of funding teams
(compared to a situation in which schools actually paid players their
market value) enables all schools to continue to field athletic
programs, and consequently preserves the existence of college sports.

23

Id. at art. 12.
See Schott, supra note 14, at 31 (stating that amateurism means that student-athletes
play for the love of the game).
25
See Const., supra note 12, at art. 12.
26
See Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as
an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 28
(2000) (noting that the NCAA has successfully convinced the public that paying college
athletes is a bad idea).
27
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
101-02 (1984) (“In order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”).
28
See Const., supra note 22, at art. 2.9.
24
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In Law v. NCAA, the NCAA defended a rule that limited the salary
of a restricted-earnings basketball coach by explicitly justifying it as
a cost-cutting measure.29 The court, however, was “dubious” that the
goal of cost reduction was a sufficient legal justification, and
ultimately rejected the rule on different grounds.30 As a result of the
dicta in Law, however, the NCAA is forced to use euphemisms like
“preserving amateurism,” as a means to justify cost-cutting rules that
maintain the number of schools fielding athletic teams.
In several cases challenging particular NCAA restrictions, the
NCAA justifies its rules by arguing that they are necessary to
“preserve amateurism.”31
The NCAA argues that preserving
amateurism is important because it enables fair competition and a
level playing field among its member schools. “Fair competition”
and “level playing field” function as euphemisms for the NCAA.
These are code words that the NCAA uses when it fears that the
product of intercollegiate sports is at risk of self-destructing because
of rising costs or disparate revenue streams among member schools.
Arguing that its rules preserve amateurism is an implicit use of the
ruinous competition defense by the NCAA. This is because the
NCAA fears that in the absence of many of its rules, competition
among member schools would cause the end of intercollegiate
athletics because of schools’ abandonment of their athletic programs
due to either high costs or low levels of consumer interest.32
29

Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id.
31
See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D.
Kan. 1999) (arguing that a rule limiting the size of corporate logos permissible on a jersey
and other uniform-related apparel was necessary to maintain amateurism); Justice v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (arguing that the imposition of
penalties against a member school that violated NCAA rules were necessary to preserve
amateurism and enhance fair competition among the member schools); Banks v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (arguing that the NCAA’s rule
prohibiting a player from signing with an agent and declaring himself eligible for a
professional draft was necessary to preserve the amateurism of college sports); Gaines v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (arguing that the nodraft rule was necessary to preserve amateurism among member schools).
32
See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 (“The NCAA sanction program was designed to
prevent intercollegiate athletic programs from being driven by the pressures to ‘remain
competitive’ into committing practices that threaten both the competitive and amateur
30
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In its cases, arguing about the importance of preserving
amateurism is important because it allows the NCAA to prevent
member schools from paying players, and thus competing with each
other on the basis of price. The NCAA fears that if amateurism
disappears, the cost of having a competitive athletic program will be
prohibitive and destroy collegiate sports.33 Of course the big
programs would likely survive, but apparently the NCAA does not
believe that the product of college sports could thrive under this
scenario.
Commentators have suggested that the NCAA divide itself into
new divisions based on the level of funding and competitiveness of a
program.34 The NCAA has never responded to these proposals,
presumably because they fear that a new version of the NCAA
featuring only the Top Twenty teams, or the Top Forty teams, lacks
the same allure as the current configuration.
A significant
modification to the NCAA, like having an organization with only
twenty teams, would create an entirely new product.
The NCAA wants to maintain the status quo because of the huge
financial success that the organization has enjoyed. To maintain the
status quo, the NCAA has justified its numerous regulations on the
basis that they preserve amateurism. Embedded in this argument is
the use of a modified version of the ruinous competition argument.
The NCAA believes that without these restrictions, vigorous
competition between member schools would cause the product of
college sports to be destroyed because many schools would not have
the financial wherewithal to maintain an athletic program.

nature of the programs.”) (citing Hennessey v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.2d
1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977); Law, 134 F.3d at 1023 (“The NCAA argues that reducing
costs . . . is necessary to maintain the existence of competitive intercollegiate sports.”).
33
See Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153; Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382.
34
Schott, supra note 14, at 43.
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B. The Restrictions Are Intended to Maintain Competition among
Member Schools
The preservation of competitive balance among member schools is
also frequently cited as a justification for NCAA restrictions.35 The
maintenance of competitive balance refers to maintaining parity
among the member schools’ athletic programs. This desire for
competitive balance is unique to the sports industry because teams
need close games for a compelling product to exist and for
consumers to remain interested in the product.36 This, of course, is
untrue in other industries.
In several cases challenging NCAA restrictions, the NCAA has
justified rules on the grounds that they maintain competitive balance
among member schools.37 The NCAA made this argument in one
case because, “[f]inancial pressures upon many members, not merely
to ‘catch up,’ but to ‘keep up,’ were beginning to threaten both the
competitive, and the amateur, nature of the programs, leading quite
possibly to abandonment by many.”38 Abandonment of athletic
programs by member schools would obviously threaten the very
existence of the NCAA.
The preservation of competition argument is thus also tied to the
NCAA’s use of the ruinous competition defense because the NCAA
fears that in the absence of its rules, schools will cease fielding
athletic programs and balanced competition among the remaining
schools will disappear.39 In the absence of legitimate competition
35
Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023; Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383;
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117
(1984); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.
1988); Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
36
Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section
1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 231 (1984).
37
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
38
Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153.
39
See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022 (contending that limiting one of the four available
coaching positions on a Division I basketball team to an entry-level position will create
more balanced competition by barring some teams from hiring four experienced coaches
rather than three).
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among its schools, the NCAA worries that demand for its product
will cease, leading to the destruction of the NCAA (if it even existed
after some schools abandoned their athletic programs).
The maintenance of competitive balance is thus necessary to
preserve the existence of the NCAA, because the organization fears
that in the absence of its rules, a larger chasm than already exists
(financially and qualitatively) among member schools’ athletic
programs would develop. Only a limited number of schools would
be able to afford to fund a competitive athletic program, leading to a
wider disparity in the quality of teams. This, in turn, would lead to
reduced consumer demand for NCAA sports and consequently, the
demise of the NCAA.
Although ruinous competition usually relates to the supply of an
industry being harmed, the situations presented in the NCAA cases
are different. The NCAA’s justifications aim to preserve both the
supply and demand of their product, because if both the supply and
the demand do not remain high, the NCAA believes that college
sports will be unable to exist. This is because the supply of teams
has a significant impact on the demand for the product. Without a
large number of member schools fielding athletic teams, consumer
interest would significantly diminish, and the NCAA would likely no
longer exist as we know it.
C. Courts’ Treatment of NCAA Justifications
The Supreme Court strongly suggested in NCAA v. Board of
Regents40 that NCAA rules designed to preserve amateurism and
competitive balance do not violate the antitrust laws.41 While the
Court has rejected a blanket exemption for all NCAA restrictions, it
has still shown great deference in permitting the NCAA to enact
restrictions that would typically be classified as unreasonable
40

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Mathew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big-Time”
College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 4
(2000) (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02).
41
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restraints of trade in other industries.42 Indeed, one NCAA rule was
upheld by the Court, despite the acknowledged effect that the rule
reduced competition among member institutions.43
In Law, the court was dubious, however, about accepting an
explicit defense from the NCAA that one of its rules was a costcutting measure.44 As a result the NCAA is forced to disguise the
purpose behind some of its rules. Consequently, NCAA arguments
proffered to courts focus on the preservation of amateurism and the
maintenance of competitive balance among member schools. It is
clear, though, that underlying the justifications offered by the NCAA
is a belief that without the restrictions the NCAA would collapse
because of the vigorous competition that would ensue among
member schools for student-athletes (the inputs into the labor
market), and the resulting lack of consumer demand for its product.
Perhaps the NCAA would be viable in a different form with fewer
members. Courts, however, have not suggested this alternative,
despite the relative obviousness of this idea. This indicates that
courts recognize that the NCAA is a unique product that may only be
sustainable in something close to its existing form.
The courts accept the NCAA’s argument that in the absence of its
rules, the product of college sports would be destroyed. Indeed, one
court stated, “in general, the NCAA’s eligibility rules allow for the
survival of the product, and allow for an even playing field.”45 By
embracing the NCAA’s arguments that restrictions aimed to preserve
amateurism and competitive balance are justified, courts accept the
NCAA’s modified version of the ruinous competition defense. The
42
McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988)
(“The eligibility rules create the product and allow its survival in the face of
commercializing pressures.”).
43
Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (analyzing
a rule that prevents an athlete from participating in intercollegiate athletics as a graduate
student at a different university from where the athlete did their undergraduate work). The
court stated, “[c]learly, the rule discourages institutions with graduate or professional
schools from inducing undergraduates at other institutions to forgo participating in the
athletic programs at their undergraduate institutions in order to preserve eligibility to
participate in intercollegiate athletics on a postbaccalaureate basis.” Id.
44
Law, 134 F.3d at 1023.
45
Smith, 139 F.3d at 187.
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courts have probably not commented on the NCAA’s unorthodox
application of the ruinous competition defense because the NCAA
has not explicitly argued that they are actually using this defense.
Perhaps courts have accepted the NCAA’s version of the ruinous
competition defense because they recognize that the sports industry
differs from other industries where the ruinous competition defense
has been rejected, because teams within a league are not true
economic competitors.46 Teams within a league need competitive
balance to ensure consumer interest in the product. Agreements
among teams in the same league are therefore not analogous to
agreements among competitors in the same industry. In non-sports
industries, agreements are more harmful because they restrict
competition within an industry. In sports leagues, however,
agreements among teams may actually enhance the development of
the league.
Having thus accepted the ruinous competition justification with
regards to the NCAA, courts should feel comfortable permitting a
new sports league to use this defense to justify its restrictions. If
start-up sports leagues are unable to justify their conduct on the basis
of preventing ruinous competition, they will likely fail and many
procompetitive benefits will not accrue.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RUINOUS COMPETITION ARGUMENT BY THE
COURT IN A NON-SPORTS CONTEXT
The ruinous competition defense is usually proffered by
competitors attempting to justify anticompetitive agreements.
Typically, parties to an agreement argue that in the absence of such
agreement, competition would drive firms in a particular industry
into bankruptcy, eventually leaving consumers at the mercy of a
monopolist.47 The Supreme Court, however, has almost uniformly
rejected the ruinous competition defense.48 Indeed, the Court has
46

See Roberts, supra note 36, at 231.
Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 127.
48
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (rejecting the
ruinous competition defense because of its controversial nature, and because the Court did
47
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rejected this defense in cases involving naked price-fixing
agreements,49 cartels, and resale-price-maintenance agreements.50
The Court in these cases has rejected the defense for various
reasons. Courts typically do not want to condone price-fixing, and
economic scholars often believe that agreements among competitors
are ineffective.51 Another reason the Court has rejected the ruinous
competition defense is that it believes that it is inappropriate for a
court to determine a reasonable rate of return for an industry.52
It is clear that excluding NCAA cases, the Court has typically
refused to allow firms to justify anticompetitive restrictions on the
grounds that requiring industry members to compete with each other
would lead to ruinous competition.53 The various NCAA cases
discussed above, however, show an implied acceptance by courts of
the NCAA’s version of the ruinous competition defense and would
enable the Court to allow start-up sports leagues to also use the
ruinous competition defense.

not want to be forced to determine a reasonable rate of profit for an industry); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (holding that fear of “ruinous
competition” is not a justification for price-fixing); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v.
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (holding that dress designers were prevented
from acting in collusion to ensure that their investment in original clothing designs be
recouped); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978)
(rejecting a professional association’s canon of ethics because it illegally fixed prices). But
see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (holding that competing
coal producers could form an agreement for the purpose of promoting efficiency, provided
that the intent was not to unreasonably restrain trade).
49
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175
U.S. 211, 273 (1899) (rejecting a naked price-fixing agreement among steel pipe
manufacturers created for the purpose of avoiding huge losses that might result because of
competition between the companies).
50
Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 134.
51
Id. at 138.
52
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 331-32.
53
See Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players and
the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 544 (1997); see also Mackey v. Nat’l Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).

SCHWRTZ.FINAL

2002]

2/15/02 3:01 PM

START-UP SPORTS LEAGUES

661

III. THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF NCAA JUSTIFICATIONS WARRANTS
REDUCED ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF START-UP SPORTS LEAGUES
In today’s world, new professional sports leagues face an
extremely competitive and crowded marketplace. In an effort to
limit costs, each new league has been formed as a single entity.54 In
addition to the perceived cost-effectiveness of the league structure,
the single entity offers protection from the antitrust laws because
there can be no agreement that violates section 1 of the Sherman Act
if there is only one actor making decisions.55 There have been
challenges, however, to the validity of the single-entity structure.56
In Fraser, the players have alleged that the single-entity structure of
MLS is a sham, and charged the league with antitrust violations.57
Regardless of whether start-up leagues are true single entities, the
conduct of these start-up sports leagues should be subject to less
strict antitrust scrutiny than is applied to other industries. A
professional sports league is in a unique industry that deserves
special protection because of the extraordinarily high start-up costs.58
These leagues should be able to employ restrictions that enable a
league to limit labor costs and recoup other heavy start-up costs. As
discussed above, courts have demonstrated great deference towards
the NCAA’s alleged anticompetitive conduct, and have permitted use
of the NCAA’s version of the ruinous competition argument by often
upholding NCAA restrictions on the grounds that the rules are
necessary to preserve amateurism and to maintain competitive
balance among member schools.
The NCAA’s amateurism argument is a sham, however, and startup sports leagues can readily be compared to the NCAA. Start-up
sports leagues, like the NCAA, also need the ability to create
54

This includes MLS, WUSA, the WNBA, and the XFL.
A single firm is not subject to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act, because a
combination restraining trade requires the presence of at least two independent actors.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
56
See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998).
57
Id.
58
These include very high labor and operation costs, such as building new stadiums. It
is necessary to incur these costs because they lend an element of legitimacy to new leagues.
55
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restrictions that maintain competitive balance. Because of the
similarities between new sports leagues and the NCAA, and start-up
leagues’ corresponding need for protection, the Court should permit
start-up professional sports leagues to employ necessary restrictions.
If the Court fails to permit these necessary restrictions, new leagues
will be unsustainable and will collapse.
In Section A of this Part, several comparisons will be drawn
revealing the similarities between start-up sports leagues and
the NCAA.
Section B will examine how the NCAA’s
commercialization, and its departure from the amateur ideals upon
which it was founded, make start-up sports leagues indistinguishable
from the NCAA. Section C will discuss the unique nature of sports
leagues relative to other industries. It will also discuss the
procompetitive benefits that teams in start-up leagues generate, and
argue that start-ups, like the NCAA, should be able to use the ruinous
competition argument as grounds for reduced antitrust scrutiny.
Without reduced antitrust scrutiny, these new leagues will fail and
various procompetitive benefits will be sacrificed. Section D will
briefly propose that a few restraints that are typically challenged
should be permitted in a start-up league to ensure its long-term
viability.
A. Comparison of Start-Up Sports Leagues to the NCAA
The NCAA was founded upon ideals of amateurism.59 This
idealism has disappeared from the NCAA, however, and been
replaced by a multi-billion-dollar industry and, consequently, the
commercialization of NCAA student-athletes.60
Despite the
pervasive commercialism and subsequent shift away from the basis
upon which the NCAA was founded, one of the main reasons why
59

See Const., supra note 22, at art. 1.2(c). One of the purposes of the NCAA is “[t]o
encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with . . . standards of scholarship,
sportsmanship and amateurism.” Id.
60
Pekron, supra note 26, at 27 n.15 (citing Mike McGraw et al., Money Games Inside
the NCAA: Revenues Dominate College Sports World, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 5, 1997, at A1
(noting that college athletics generates almost two billion dollars in annual revenue for the
305 schools in Division I athletics)).
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the courts have allowed NCAA restrictions that would otherwise be
deemed anticompetitive to stand, is the belief that the restrictions
somehow preserve this “amateur” tradition.61 In many respects,
though, a start-up sports league is indistinguishable from the NCAA.
1. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Have Power to
Determine their Labor Costs
The NCAA has complete power over the amount of money that it
spends on labor, which limits both the salary and the number of
athletes that any member school can employ.62 The NCAA limits the
“salary” that its athletes receive to the cost of attending the
respective member institution, plus money for room and board. The
NCAA also limits the number of players that are permitted on each
team’s roster. Former Executive Director of the NCAA, Richard
Schultz, conceded that a primary reason stipends (beyond the value
of tuition, room and board) are not paid to student-athletes is to
lower costs.63 This is comparable to professional sports in that many
start-up leagues have low salary caps that limit the amount of money
that a team can spend on its athletes, as well as strict roster
restrictions that limit the number of players on each team. These
rules are used to lower costs and maintain competitive balance
among the teams by suppressing wages to a level that is beneath
market value and is affordable for all teams.
The NCAA has complete power over the marketplace because any
athlete who desires to play college (or most professional) sports has
no choice but to accept the NCAA’s restrictions.64 This is analogous
to professional sports, where there is only one “major” league in each
sport.65 For example, if an athlete wants to play professional
61

Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
63
Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 217 (1990).
64
See Pekron, supra note 26, at 27. An athlete has the option to bypass college and
play professional sports immediately, but only Major League Baseball has an organized
minor league for players that are unable to play at the highest level.
65
Of course minor leagues exist in every sport. But in each sport there is one
established league where the best players participate. For a discussion and history of the
62
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baseball in the Unites States he must submit to the rules created by
Major League Baseball.
2. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Have Power to
Sanction Members
Also comparable to professional sports leagues, the NCAA
functions as a governing body that employs strict enforcement
procedures for rules violations, and the guilty must comply with any
sanctions imposed for violations of NCAA rules.66 Violation of rules
in either professional leagues or the NCAA can subject a team or
member institution to harsh penalties.67 The NCAA has a committee
that makes recommendations regarding penalties for rules violations,
while professional sports leagues have a commissioner that is
responsible for doling out punishment when rules violations occur.
3. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Crown a Single
Champion
For years the NCAA resisted the lure of trying to crown a
champion in college football. In recent years, however, the NCAA
has created a system designed to determine an overall champion in
college football. The creation of the Bowl Championship Series by
the NCAA enables the two highest rated teams in college football to
play in a game to crown a national champion. More importantly,
perhaps, the new system creates enormous revenues for the teams
and closely resembles the Super Bowl.68 This is yet another
notion that only one “major” league of each sport can flourish, see Part III. C., infra.
66
Pekron, supra note 26, at 27; see also McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356
(D. Ariz. 1983).
67
See McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338. In the NBA, the Minnesota Timberwolves recently
received a harsh punishment from the Commissioner’s office for trying to circumvent the
salary cap.
68
See Goldman, supra note 63, at 217 (noting that member institutions are constantly
seeking new ways to maximize revenues, and suggesting that the playoff system is not
motivated by a desire to determine the number one school, or even to enhance amateurism,
but rather to increase revenues).
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similarity between college sports and their professional counterparts,
as all professional leagues are designed to determine a champion of
the respective leagues through an extensive playoff system that
generates huge television-rights fees.
B. The Professionalization of College Sports Has Pierced the
NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism and Makes the NCAA and
Professional Sports Indistinguishable
Although the NCAA was founded upon ideals of amateurism,
collegiate sports are now thoroughly commercialized. Indeed, one
court acknowledged, “College [sports are] a terrific American
institution that generates nonpecuniary benefits for players and fans,
but it is also a vast commercial venture that yields substantial profits
for colleges both on and off the field.”69
At the highest level of the NCAA, athletes are at least
semiprofessionals, as they receive several thousand dollars per year
(in the form of a scholarship) for playing sports, often with the goal
of playing professional sports for much more money.70 In fact, at
some schools, college football players receive a wage of
approximately nine dollars per hour for their work in football and
football-related activities.71 Some coaches make salaries well in
excess of any other university employee.72 A university certainly
69
Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (“[W]hile organized as a non-profit
organization, the NCAA—and its member institutions—are . . . engaged in a business
venture of far greater magnitude than the vast majority of ‘profit-making’ enterprises.”)
(citing Hennessey v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977)).
70
Pekron, supra note 26, at 56; Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer
Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2658 (1996); see also Goldman, supra note 63, at 234
(“Athletes are often motivated by a desire to reap the rewards of a professional career.”). If
on scholarship, the athlete receives free tuition, books, and room and board, a salary that
totals several thousand dollars per year. Id. Indeed, a student-athlete’s relationship with its
member school has been compared to that of an employer-employee relationship. Schott,
supra note 14, at 34-35.
71
Pekron, supra note 26 (citing RICHARD G. SHEEHAN, KEEPING SCORE: THE
ECONOMICS OF BIG-TIME SPORTS 296-98 (1996)).
72
Pekron, supra note 26, at 57. The average college football coach makes at least four
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would not subsidize athletes and pay coaches large amounts of
money unless the school realized a financial reward. The costbenefit analysis for many schools is simple, as the sports programs
often generate millions of dollars for their university.73
In football bowl games,74 the NCAA permits oversized corporate
logos to be sewn on to jerseys of the participating teams. 75 These
patches identifying the bowl game sponsors are not subject to the
size limits created in the rule that was challenged in Adidas.76 Not
coincidentally, these sponsors pay the NCAA a tremendous amount
of money to earn this sponsorship right. This blatant hypocrisy by
the NCAA reveals that if the price is right, the players can become
walking billboards.77
Total revenues in the NCAA have increased 8000% in the last
quarter century.78 The NCAA has increased these revenues with
little concern for how the athletes are affected, either physically or in
the classroom.79 Some players cannot even choose what shoes they
will wear, as some athletes are forced to wear athletic shoes
designated by the terms of their coach’s large contract with a shoe
manufacturer.80
As part of the amateur foundation of the NCAA, it was also
thought that each student-athlete’s primary reason to be in college
times as much as the average professor at the same institution. See FRANCIS X. DEALY, JR.,
WIN AT ANY COST: THE SELL OUT OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 165 (1990).
73
See NAND HART-NIBBRIG & CLEMENT COTTINGHAM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COLLEGE SPORTS 3 (1986).
74
Bowl games are postseason games that serve as a reward to college football teams
that have had a successful season.
75
See Mitten, supra note 41, at 6.
76
Adidas Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan.
1999).
77
Teams participating in the Bowl Championship Series may each receive over $10
million per school. Apparently, this is enough revenue for the NCAA to discard its moral
high ground.
78
Pekron, supra note 26 (citing McGraw, supra note 60, at A1). In the 1990s corporate
sponsorships increased sevenfold. Id.
79
See Goldman, supra note 63, at 241 (noting how lengthy basketball and football
seasons and late night game times to increase television exposure represent commercial
concerns prevailing over educational interests).
80
Id. at 241 n.265 (citing Brown, Rubber Sole: Should College Basketball Coaches
Accept Sneaker Money?, 7 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (1989)).
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was to get an education.81 The professionalization of college sports,
however, has contributed to a reduced emphasis on the pursuit of an
education. Indeed, at many of the schools with premier athletic
programs, a student-athlete’s education is less important than the
team for which they play.82 The lack of emphasis on a studentathlete’s education is further evidence of the NCAA’s increasing
professionalization.
The NCAA has clearly deviated from its purely amateur origins
and become professionalized.83 While some remnants of amateurism
certainly remain, the receipt of scholarships and stipends, the
sponsorships on the uniforms, the shoe deals, and the lack of
emphasis on education all evidence how the NCAA has become
increasingly commercialized. Indeed, the NCAA does not even
require that athletes truly receive no payments for their athletic skills,
as it permits athletes to participate in one NCAA sport even if they
are professionals in a different sport.84
C. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Should Enjoy Reduced
Antitrust Scrutiny
Courts have chosen to overlook the commercialization of the
NCAA and continue to show great deference to that organization in
an effort to preserve college sports. Start-up sports leagues are
comparable to the NCAA and should also be subject to reduced
antitrust scrutiny. This would enable the new leagues to use the
NCAA’s version of the ruinous competition defense to ensure their
survival in today’s crowded sports and entertainment marketplace.

81

See Pekron, supra note 26, at 55-56.
Id. at 58. Only a minimum level of proficiency is required of an athlete once in
college. Id. (reciting story of player at Ohio State University who took classes in AIDS
awareness, golf, and music appreciation to maintain his eligibility).
83
Bill Russell, former star basketball player for the Boston Celtics observed, “[t]o me,
being an amateur is like being a virgin. It is an old idea that has some innocence and charm,
celebrated mostly by people to whom it does not apply.” Goldman, supra note 63, at 234.
84
Pekron, supra note 26, at 60.
82
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The balancing test a court employs in a rule of reason analysis85
typically has limited appreciation for noncommercial or
noneconomic motives that may underlie a particular industry
practice.86 The Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,87 however,
implied that noncommercial factors may be considered in the
antitrust calculus.88 In United States v. Brown University,89 the court
also held that noncommercial justifications should be considered.90
This is important because a start-up sports league generates many
noneconomic benefits that should be considered when evaluating the
legality of a particular restraint by a new league.
Courts need to recognize and appreciate that a sports league is
different from other industries because cooperation among member
teams is necessary, as sports teams are incapable of producing
anything of value independently.91 Although a start-up league’s
conduct may restrain trade to some degree, these industry restraints
are not so harmful that they lack any redeeming value.92 Certain
conduct that start-up sports leagues engage in may not have the
overall effect of enhancing intraleague competition, but it may
85
Under the rule of reason, an antitrust defendant has the opportunity to provide
evidence of procompetitive justifications in support of a challenged activity. These
procompetitive features are then balanced against any discoverable anticompetitive effects
to determine the net competitive significance of the challenged industry practice. See
Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 690 (1978)).
86
Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746 (noting that while certain noneconomic,
noncommercial league restraints are anticompetitive in the sense that they do nothing to
enhance or promote competition off the field, these rules are uniquely procompetitive
because they ultimately make for a better league product on the field).
87
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
88
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 771, 787 (1975); see also Lee Goldman, The
Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The Proper Treatment of
Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 164 (1995) (noting that the language in Goldfarb suggests that courts
may factor noneconomic considerations into a substantive antitrust analysis).
89
5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
90
Id. (“We conclude that the district court was obliged to more fully investigate the
procompetitive and noneconomic justifications proffered by MIT than it did when it
performed the truncated rule of reason analysis.”).
91
Roberts, supra note 36, at 227-28.
92
Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746; see also Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979) (commenting that the
goals of justice and the antitrust law demand protection of competitors).
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nonetheless possess redeeming virtues from a noncommercial
standpoint that should withstand a reduced level of antitrust scrutiny,
and also enable the league to survive.93 One commentator noted,
“[t]o be sure, [teams] are vigorous athletic competitors, for that is the
very essence of the product which they jointly sell. In no meaningful
way, however, are the clubs natural economic competitors.”94
1. Sports Leagues Are Extremely Risky and Few Are
Economically Viable
The economic health of teams in new leagues is tenuous.95
Creating a professional sports league is extremely expensive, as there
are massive labor and operational costs. New leagues need time to
develop competitive teams, attract a loyal fan following, and recoup
heavy start-up costs.96
Accomplishing these tasks is nearly
impossible if start-up leagues are subject to the same antitrust
scrutiny as other industries because parity, and thus consumer
interest, would be difficult to maintain with little centralized control.
Without centralized control, it is likely that a dominant team or two
would emerge because of their relative financial strength to other
teams in the league, and too little interest in the league would be
developed in the markets with unsuccessful teams. Start-up sports
leagues should therefore be permitted to engage in conduct that is
subject to less strict antitrust scrutiny.
Sports leagues present a unique form of industrial organization that
bears little resemblance to other industries, particularly those that are
more frequently the target of antitrust review.97 In contrast to other
industries, league teams do not attempt, nor do they desire, to drive
one another out of the market.98 Courts long ago recognized this,
93

Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746.
Roberts, supra note 36, at 231.
95
See McBurney, supra note 10, at 950.
96
Id.
97
See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 744.
98
See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). If stronger teams
were to drive weaker teams out of the market, there would eventually be too few teams to
operate the league. See McBurney, supra note 10, at 932 (citing United States v. Nat’l
Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953)). Although some leagues, like
94
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and consequently, the unique nature of professional sports.99 This
recognition of the unique nature of sports has not translated,
however, into judicial deference when analyzing professional
leagues’ restraints. This lack of deference persists despite the
treatment courts have afforded the NCAA in implicitly permitting
use of the ruinous competition argument.
In professional sports, it has been proved through the success and
failures of various leagues that the sports industry is extremely risky
and costly.100 In almost all of the current “major” sports, rival
leagues have emerged over the years only to quickly merge with the
existing league or disappear altogether.101 This is because high costs
Major League Baseball, are currently considering contraction, a league would certainly
prefer to not be forced to contract.
99
See NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 323.
The ordinary business makes every effort to sell as much of its products or services
as it can. In the course of doing this it may and often does put many of its
competitors out of the business. The ordinary businessman is not troubled by the
knowledge that he is doing so well that his competitors are being driven out of
business. Professional teams in a league, however, must not compete too well with
each other in a business way. . . . If all teams should compete as hard as they can
in a business way, the stronger teams would likely drive the weaker ones into
financial failure. If this should happen not only would the weaker teams fail, but
eventually the whole league, both the weaker and the stronger teams, would fail,
because without a league no team can operate profitably. Id.
100
See Roberts, supra note 36, at 257.
101
Id. The American Football League formed in 1960. Six years later, after both the
AFL and the NFL experienced financial difficulties as a result of frequent bidding wars for
players, Congress authorized a merger between the two leagues that bypassed antitrust
scrutiny and avoided financial ruin of the two leagues. Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 771
n.180 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)). In 1974, the World Football League [hereinafter
WFL] emerged as a challenger to the NFL. The WFL never became a legitimate threat and
went bankrupt approximately one year after its formation. Id. (citing Mid-South Grizzlies v.
Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984). The United States Football League
[hereinafter USFL] emerged as yet another challenger to the NFL in the 1980s. The USFL
charged the NFL with monopolistic conduct in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,
and after being awarded nominal damages, the league disappeared as a threat to the NFL.
See United States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1042
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The XFL was the last challenger to the NFL. This League shut down
operations after only one season, despite the financial backing of the NBC network. From
1949 to 1959, the NBA served as the only professional league until the American Basketball
League began play. The League fell apart, but only after one-and-one-half years due to
mounting financial losses. Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 771 n.180. In 1966 another
challenger to the NBA emerged, the American Basketball Association, which operated for
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involved with the sports industry, such as signing players and
building stadiums, make running a successful league particularly
risky. Subjecting a new league to reduced antitrust scrutiny will
therefore provide start-up leagues with the assurance that they will be
able to create restraints to enhance parity and consumer interest in
their product, in much the same way as the NCAA has done.
2. Procompetitive Benefits of Sports
As part of the balancing test used by a court in the rule of reason,
the procompetitive benefits of a particular restraint are weighed
against the anticompetitive effects of the restraint.102 This Note
argues that as a general rule, start-up sports leagues should not be
subject to the same level of antitrust scrutiny that established leagues
and industries are, because new leagues are subject to much greater
risks than either existing leagues or different industries. Without
such heightened protection from antitrust scrutiny, any new league
will surely fail. It is important for new leagues to flourish because of
the procompetitive economic benefits that successful leagues create,
as well as important noneconomic benefits that leagues also tend to
generate. It is therefore important to identify and discuss the
procompetitive benefits (both economic and noneconomic) that
sports leagues usually produce.
There are significant economic benefits that accrue from a sports
league. One of these benefits is downtown urban renewal.103 A new
stadium is likely to spur economic development in the area
surrounding the stadium because of the development of many mid-

ten years, only to merge some of its franchises with the NBA. Id. From 1917 to 1971, the
National Hockey League [hereinafter NHL] operated alone until the World Hockey
Association emerged, only to partly disband and merge with the NHL eight years later. Id.
In women’s basketball, two leagues began simultaneously in 1997, yet within three years
one of the leagues folded. See Elizabeth Clarke, WNBA Has Next and Beyond; League
Building Quickly With Passionate Following, PALM BEACH POST, June 20, 1999, at 1C.
102
See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978)).
103
See John R. Dorocak, Tax Advantages of Sports Franchises: Part I—The Stadium,
1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 579 (1999).
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size businesses that relocate near the stadium.104 This is a benefit
that is unique to professional sports leagues because in the absence
of such a team, newly created businesses and jobs surrounding the
new stadium would go undeveloped.
Another benefit of start-up sports leagues is that teams have the
ability to significantly impact a city’s local economy. One study
revealed that the annual local economic impact of one NFL team was
$120 million.105 While start-up sports leagues’ teams would
certainly not be able to generate that amount of revenue for a city in
its initial stages, there would definitely be some positive economic
impact in the form of construction jobs created, new spending in the
community by people who attend games, and the attraction of
tourists to a city with a new sports facility.106 These procompetitive
benefits only have the opportunity to accrue if start-up sports leagues
are subject to less strict antitrust scrutiny. In the absence of reduced
scrutiny the new leagues are unlikely to make large capital
investments in things like a new stadium or arena because of a
league’s potential for quick failure.
Historically, under rule of reason analysis, courts have primarily
analyzed allegedly anticompetitive conduct in terms of their
economic effects, judging the reasonableness of a restraint by its
effect on the commercial marketplace.107 The Court in Goldfarb,
however, implied that noncommercial factors may be applied in the
antitrust calculus.108 In the context of new sports leagues there are
many intangible noneconomic benefits generated that should be
weighed when determining the legality of any restraints.
104

Id.
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See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: Are Stadiums
Worth the Cost?, 1997 BROOKINGS REV. 35 (1997), available at 1997 WL 10193568. There
is also a multiplier effect, as increased local income causes further new spending and job
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supra note 105, at 652.
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Teams in professional sports leagues are considered unique
Economists and other commentators have
cultural assets.109
acknowledged that sports teams, and thus sports leagues, can spark a
city’s economy and confer on a locality intangible benefits such as
entertainment, civic pride, and national television exposure.110
Indeed, sports teams also have the ability to create a cultural identity
that crosses race, ethnic and class lines.111
Sports teams also provide local communities with “consumption
benefits,” which are comparable to benefits provided by parks, golf
courses, swimming pools, and concert halls.112 Different from these
other forms of entertainment, however, sports teams’ consumption
benefits have unique economic characteristics because local residents
benefit from the mere presence of a professional team in the
community.113 Indeed, sports teams capture public attention far out
of proportion to their economic significance, as the media provides
attention to the teams because of how passionate fans are.114 None
of these intangible benefits can accrue to a community that hosts a
team in a start-up league unless such a league is provided protection
from the antitrust laws, because new leagues will fail if subject to
strict antitrust scrutiny, due to an inability to ensure parity and to
maintain low labor costs.
D. Restraints that Should Be Permissible by a Start-Up Sports
League
Certainly, a start-up sports league should not have a blanket
exemption from antitrust law. Rather, only restraints that permit a
start-up league to begin to recoup some of its investment and reduce
109
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 913 (1999).
110
See Dorocak, supra note 102; see also John Riley, Fields of Green, NEWSDAY, Aug.
18, 1996, at A04.
111
See Bowling, supra note 105, at 649.
112
See Kevin Green, et al., Using Tax-Exempt Bonds to Finance Professional Sports
Stadiums, 78 TAX NOTES 1663, 1672 (1998).
113
Id. at 1666; see also Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 106 (acknowledging that a team’s
new stadium generates more local consumer satisfaction than alternative investments).
114
Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 106.
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some of the risks associated with beginning a new league should be
permissible. A complete discussion of the specific impact of each
restraint is beyond the scope of this paper, but some restraints that a
league should be allowed to employ include a salary cap, a rule
limiting player mobility that resembles baseball’s old “reserve
clause,”115 and a rule limiting a team’s ability to relocate. These
rules would generally enable a league to keep costs low in the
beginning stages of a league’s existence, create parity among the
teams, and enable teams to develop roots in markets that the league
feels are best for the overall good of the league.
CONCLUSION
Start-up sports leagues should be entitled to use the NCAA’s
version of the ruinous competition defense to justify reduced
antitrust scrutiny. Courts have permitted this defense to be used by
the NCAA to justify restrictions that reduce competition among
member schools off the field and increase parity on the field, thus
enabling the product of NCAA sports to continue to exist. Start-up
sports leagues are comparable to the NCAA because of the extensive
commercialization of the organization in recent years. Sports
leagues are extremely risky investments that generate significant
procompetitive economic and intangible benefits for society.
Consequently, permitting new leagues to be subject to reduced
antitrust scrutiny would enable the survival of new sports leagues
and the accrual of accompanying procompetitive benefits.

115

The reserve clause was a device used in professional baseball that enabled a team to
reserve the rights to a player’s services even after expiration of a player’s contract.
Rosenbaum, supra note 16. It was used as a way to create parity in a league. Id.

